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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY
CPLR 3121: Party may not retain adversary's expert.
In Gnoi v. City of New York, 011 a malpractice suit, the
physical condition of plaintiff was in issue. Defendant hired
an expert to assist it in determining whether or not it was
negligent. At the trial, this expert was allowed to testify over
defendant's objections, in behalf of plaintiff. The appellate division,
first department, held that this constituted reversible error.
The court stated that "where a party . . . does not lack expert
testimony of his own choosing, an expert engaged by the opposing
party should not be sought out and placed in the unethical position
of accepting a retainer from both sides.""""
CPLR 3126: Substantial attorney's fees imposed.
In spite of the liberal construction of disclosure provisions
under the CPLR, 1 2 attorneys still engage in various dilatory tactics
in order to avoid disclosing vital information to their adversaries.113
Although severe penalties are available under CPLR 3126 1 4
for refusal to make disclosure, courts have been reluctant to
impose them."5
110 29 App. Div. 2d 404, 288 N.Y.S.2d 368 (1st Dep't 1968).
"'Id. at 407, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 371. See also Gugliano v. Levi, 24 App.
Div. 2d 591, 262 N.Y.S.2d 372 (2d Dep't 1965).
112 Rios v. Donovan, 21 App. Div. 2d 409, 250 N.Y.S.2d 818 (1st Dep't
1964). The liberal views expressed in Rios were reaffirmed in Allen v.
Crowell-Collier Publishing Company, 21 N.Y.2d 403, 235 N.E.2d 430, 288
N.Y.S2,d 449 (1968).
"13Warner v. Bumgarner, 49 Misc. 2d 488, 267 N.Y.S.2d 825 (Sup. Ct.
Monroe County 1966) (defendant's attempt to avoid disclosure bordered on
the tortious).
"14 CPLR 3126 provides that "[i]f any party ... refuses to obey an order
for disclosure or willfully fails to disclose information which the court finds
ought to have been disclosed, the court may make such orders with regard
to the failure or refusal as are just, among them:
1. an order that issues to which the information is relevant shall be
deemed resolved . . . [in movant's favor] . .. or
2. an order prohibiting the disobedient party from supporting or opposing
designated claims or defenses . . . or
3. an order striking out pleadings or parts thereof . or dismissing
the action .. . or rendering a judgment by default against the dis-
obedient party.
While the statute uses the word "order" courts have held that a notice of
disclosure is sufficient. See infra, note 117.
1'2 Coffey v. Orbachs, Inc., 22 App. Div. 2d 317, 254 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1st
Dep't 1964); Fleming v. Fleming, 50 Misc. 2d 323, 270 N.Y.S.2d 352(Sup. Ct. Queens County 1966);. Warner v. Bumgarner, 49 Misc. 2d 488,
267 N.Y.S2d 825 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1966); Di Bartolo v. American
& Foreign Ins. Co., 48 Misc. 2d 843, 265 N.Y.S.2d 981 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk
County 1966); Burbell v. Burman, 44 Misc. 2d 749, 255 N.Y.S.2d 56 (Sup.
Ct. Bronx County 1964); Mostow v. Shorr, 44 Misc. 2d 733, 255 N.Y.S.2d
320 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1964). Cf. Gaffney v. City of New York,
198]
